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TRANSFER OF WARTIME REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMMAND AUTHORITY ROK military will be reborn as the self-reliant forces both nominally and virtually, which will take the full responsibility … -The ROK President Roh Mu Hyun 1 Since the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States have successfully deterred further armed conflict and managed numerous crises on the Korean peninsula, relying on the strong blood-relationship between the two countries. Also, they have made remarkable progress over several decades in the military area -conducting advanced military training and education, developing military doctrine and operational planning, and upgrading logistics and weapons systems. However, there have been conflicts and challenges between the two countries as well. One of these conflicts has involved issues surrounding the transfer of command authority. Since then, a more positive and equitable relationship has developed between the ROK and U.S. militaries. The ROK now has the 11 th largest economic Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world. The current administration has initiated a program of self-defense, whereby South Korea will be able to fully counter the North Korean threat with purely domestic means within the next two decades. Through this process, the ROK military has already improved its capability to conduct theater operations and has strengthened the nation's self-defense capability through transformation. 4 The ROK leadership believes that it is now necessary to transfer wartime command authority to the ROK government. The ROK Government envisions this transfer occurring within the near future as an expansion of its political-military role. Officially, the ROK and U.S. governments have agreed to desirable changes "modifying the command relationship"
within the near future.
This SRP reviews the background of the command and control relations of our two armed forces for the last half century. It identifies major regional security issues and examines both ongoing ROK and U.S. military policies. It then suggests a new paradigm for regional security cooperation for peace and unification of the Korean peninsula. It recommends ways to minimize the security threats to the two allies and suggests a more appropriate and efficient command structure. It concludes with recommendations for the Korean military to develop and meet the wartime command authority requirements of the future.
Background of the ROK-U.S. Command and Control Relationship
The command and control relationship of the ROK military forces and the U.S. forces in To understand the ROK-U.S. command relationships in Korea, it is necessary to comprehend the three organizations. Figure #1 depicts these very complicated interrelationships. The second organization is the bi-national war-fighting organization, the ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command (CFC) that was established in 1978. Its mission is to deter attack on South Korea and to defend the nation in the event of an attack. 10 Both during the Armistice and in war, the ROK-U.S. CFC receives its strategic guidance from both the ROK and the U.S. Regional Security Interests; North East Asia Given its territorial situation, surrounded by strong countries such as China, Russia, and Japan, the Republic of Korea has been a key player and important strategic bridge between the Northeast Asian continental countries. Over the last half-century, the Northeast Asia region has seen dynamic changes and has generally seen no major war. But historical undercurrents of conflicts and conflicting national territorial interests have challenged regional security, even though they have recently abated considerably. 12 Pending hot issues such as Taiwan, North
Korea's nuclear proliferation and military threat, China's military development, Japan's assertive diplomacy, the Korean peninsular situation, and other uncertainties will challenge Northeast Asia security. 13 Indeed, it is unclear whether changing the command relationship will create a more conducive atmosphere between the ROK and the United States, or threaten the continual development of common security interests in the Northeast region. To avert an aggressive North Korean attack is the key factor to promote and to positively contribute to regional stability and security. This examination of the regional security picture begins with the perspectives and strategic interests of the region's nations.
North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), one of the world's most devastated countries, has failed to meet its ordinary people's basic needs for food and energy. Also, the militaristic regime of Kim Jong-il, the Chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commission, has deteriorated. One remarkable characteristic of North Korea nowadays is that the ruling hierarchy has so far successfully kept the populace under its dictatorial control only within 300 km of Pyongyang. 14 As shown in Figure #2 , compared to South Korean troops, the States, Japan, China, and Russia) will be one of the methods to pressure and convince North Korea. These talks, and possible four-party talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China, can provide a framework for the discussion and solution of North Korean and regional security issues.
China
The People's Republic of China (PRC) -a Communist nation -hosts one-quarter of the world's population (a billion people) and the world's largest Army. The PRC has a strong interest in the Korean peninsula and is North Korea's largest supporter. As an emerging global power, China's involvement is crucial to building regional security in the Asian-Pacific area.
China will leverage its military and economic power in an effort to expand its role in the region.
China is actively participating in the process of resolving the most serious security issues, However, the change of command relationship between the ROK and the United States will also provide more flexible forces in the region to deter and react to any circumstance in the Northeast Asian region, including Taiwan. With such a flexible military capability, the United
States can take a more proactive role in its dealings with the PRC to resolve regional security problems. The important challenge will be to insure that China recognizes that the new command structure is symbolic of the strength, not the weakness, of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Japan
The traditional Japanese view of the geopolitical importance of the Korean Peninsula is often explained by describing Korea as a dagger pointed toward Japan. This view leads the Japanese to prefer the status quo on the Korean issue. However, historically Korea has never sought to invade Japan. But Japan has invaded Korea several times over the centuries, most recently in 1905. Japan occupied the country for 36 years, until the end of World War II, after which Korea was divided. The current disputes over Tokdo/Takeshima Island, as well as the controversy over the Japanese textbooks and war memories more generally, reflect underlying differences between Korea and Japan. These differences must be resolved before relations between the two countries can become friendly and stable, thereby transcending the long-term generally hostile relationship.
Japan is strengthening its military power and has increased its involvement in the security issues of the Northeast region. Japan's Self Defense Forces are also increasing their interoperability with the U.S. forces in Japan in an effort to create a unified command. 16 Depending on changes in the command relationship between the ROK and U.S. forces, Japan may call for an end to the UN-Japan SOFA, if so, the mission of the UN rear command would end, the seven supporting bases located in Japan would no longer be UNC bases, and the non-U.S. forces (such as those of Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom) could no longer be based in or transit freely through Japan. 17 Therefore, even if the command relationship in Korea changes, the UNC must be maintained so that the role of UNC (Rear)
Headquarters and the seven bases in Japan will continue for the effective support of wartime operations in Korea.
United States
The ROK-U.S. alliance 18 ROK President Roh observed during the commemoration ceremony, "the ROK military will be reborn as the self-reliant forces both nominally and virtually, which will take the full responsibility of the security of the Korean Peninsula by having the Wartime Operational
Control." He then declared that the Republic of Korea should have a firm national defense posture to guarantee peace and accept greater responsibility for its own defense. He pledged to enhance the nation's military capability and to develop an independent self-defense capability through modernization.
It will be a compatible structure in which the ROK will command the ROK military and the United States will command U.S. forces. It will not be a unilateral command structure but only a mutual, cooperative structure. Thus, it will be the similar concept as holding joint military operations. 26 The ROKG has announced that it has formulated a detailed plan internally and indicated that they now need full negotiations between the ROKG and the U.S. government to consummate the transfer of war time command authority to the ROKG.
Conditions for Transferring of Wartime Command Authority
With only peacetime operational authority over its forces, Korea cannot be called a truly sovereign nation because the wartime command authority reverts to the ROK-U.S. Combined Having clarified the term and calling on my experience as a ROK Army officer, I will now suggest a more appropriate and efficient command structure for the ROK-U.S. forces in Korea in peace and wartime. This ROK-U.S. combined forces structure should be tailored for theater employment with a focused strategic headquarters, modeled on the CFC structure, and organized through mutual agreement. This organization would receive strategic direction from the ROK and U.S. Military Committees, it would be headed by a ROK general during both wartime and peacetime, and it would be a combatant command. For the conduct of combined and joint military operations, or in case of an emergency operation, it will be task-organized using both ROK and U.S. forces from each service. The CFC Commander would be a ROK four-star general. He would exercise command authority, but each ally would maintain operational control of its own troops. The ROK general would be dual-hatted as both CFC and wartime command authority should enhance the ROK-U.S. relationship, regional security, and the ability of both nations to achieve their strategic objectives.
Challenges for the Future Korean Army
To be able to execute the wartime command authority required for the future, the ROK Army must increase its capabilities and develop a strong and balanced armed force. This role would contribute significantly to the long-term goal of ROK Army self-reliant defense.
It is obvious that without considerable U.S. military presence, regional peace and security would be jeopardized. A USFK presence is the most efficient means to maintain the peace and balance of power. Even so, in order to deter aggression and maintain the peace, the ROK Army must overcome certain environmental and domestic challenges.
Environmental Challenges
The most serious challenges or risks come from the threats of an invasion or attack from
North Korea. The first challenge is to deter a North Korean attack. War is not a game, nor an exercise; it determines the fate of the country. We can never repair and recover those killed and maimed in combat. Decision-makers who have experience on the battlefield have a great responsibility for the war.
Second, the ROK-U.S. forces face new challenges of a changed strategic environment.
They are currently challenged to manage change within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment. It will be more and more complex and diverse than in any other past era. We do not know what will happen in the very uncertain and unclear situation on the battlefield. Therefore, to deal with the changes in modern warfare, which is marked by opportunities and threats, more fundamental and profound concepts and approaches are required for both ROK and U.S. forces.
The third challenge is the new circumstances of the ROK and U.S. forces. The United
States is trying to change the character of its forces in Korea to be a more flexible force that can be deployed throughout Northeast Asia. The U.S. wants to build a more capable global force structure, so it will continue to work toward "effective, relevant, agile, and sustained to meet the challenges of the 21 st century security environment." 28 Some military experts have said that if the Korean forces take over operational control from the United States, the USFK will be slashed drastically. Further, we cannot expect any great increase in their number in wartime.
Perhaps the current defense posture will transform into a parallel arrangement, whereby Korea controls its armed forces and the United States its own -the end of combined forces. Either case would mean a decisive change in the USFK, the pillar of our national security. In particular, with the transfer of wartime command authority, any change in the combined command structure should be planned and implemented in this broader context.
The fourth challenge is reforming of ROK armed force structure and developing the technology based forces. ROK Army has developed "Army Vision," reflecting the changed Army operating environment to include the National Defense Reform 2020 based on the Army Vision 2025. 29 The ROKG and ROK Armed Forces continue reforming and innovation to accomplish its mission and develop capabilities for planning, executing of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) implementation so that they can rely on their own capabilities in the Korean theater during wartime.
Domestic Challenges

Enhancing Theater Operation Planning and Training Ability
The ROK JCS needs to have a theater planning capability to secure the Korean Peninsula.
Currently, the ROK JCS operation plan (OPLAN) is integrated into the United Nations
Command/Combined Forces Command OPLAN. If war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK must bear major responsibility and decisively win on the battlefield. In addition to developing its planning ability, the ROK JCS needs to establish systems, processes, and doctrines to achieve victory, whether in peace or war. The ROK JCS and the future CFC (as a combatant command) have a great responsibility to conduct combined and joint operations and to train the forces.
Develop Vision and Strategic Leadership
As strategic leaders, future ROK generals should provide the vision and the concepts.
They must institutionalize a strategy to implement the vision, including the selection and mentoring of subordinate leaders to carry on the strategic vision. They face a volatile strategic situation and need to develop critical competencies at the strategic level; set the long-term direction for the organization; and develop the ability of the commander to achieve his vision and accomplish effectively the task at hand by working with coalitions, interagencies, and all services, to achieve solutions that all participants can support.
Develop Decision Making System
These skills are critical for the future of the ROK Armed forces, which like the U.S. Army, is entering the post-transformation era. Further, the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula is becoming more and more challenging. The ROK Army must adopt the most advanced technology to enable commanders to make the best future battlefield decisions. They must not only capitalize on the new technology but must also integrate this new technology into their Army.
Understand the Global Strategic Environment
To conduct missions and coordinate with the U.S. Army, ROK military leaders need to learn more about the U.S. Army's structure and policies. They must understand the global strategic environment that will impact greatly on the future ROK Armed Forces. As senior ROK leaders who can deal with and solve the ROK-U.S. global security problems, they will enhance and broaden their understanding about ROK-U.S. political issues, the national security of both countries, and military strategy based on global and regional problems.
Conclusions
There is no reason for unnecessarily delaying the transfer of wartime command authority to the ROKG. The tide of Korean public opinion can not be reversed. Regaining wartime command authority would enhance ROK confidence, power, and regional influence and provide a balance of power with its neighboring countries. This would go a long way toward the achievement of long-term stability in the region and would serve as the basis for establishing a healthy U.S.-Korean alliance for the 21st century. However, both the ROK and the United
States should act deliberately. For example, U.S. policy makers mistakenly abandoned the Korean Peninsula after WWII. This led to the Korean War and caused a devastating loss of ROK and U.S. forces defending Korea. The bottom line is that without a common understanding and joint preparation by both the ROK and the United States and a clear roadmap for returning wartime command authority to Korea, any policy will fail.
The ROK and United States must deter war. To deter war, the ROK and United States should maintain sufficient force levels to deter and to defeat North Korean aggression. The ROK Armed force must pay attention to North Korea's conventional threat and posture its forces to deter war through a self-reliant defense policy. The ROKG must convince Kim Jong-il that nuclear weapons and hollow threats will not work to assure security of his regime. Further, the ROKG must continuously reassure him that the Republic of Korea will actively respond to any aggressive action from North Korea after the transfer of command authority. Also, the ROKG must simultaneously seek to guarantee the security of the North Korea people. In the end, the security of the ROK and a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula will contribute significantly to overall Northeast Asian security and stability.
Endnotes
